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DEVELOPING RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD 
by Qtrincy Wright 
The term "communist world" is ambiguous. In the theoretical sense it 
refers to those people who believe that the ideology of communism (Marx- 
ism-Leninism) provides guidelines for the best organization of society. In 
the practiccrl sense it refers to those governments and parties that profess to 
pursue domestic and foreign policies to realize this ideology. In either sense, 
the political importance of communism, or of any other ideology or religion, 
is relative to the means crnployed by its devotees which usually vary with the 
time and spacr in which they expect it to be realized, and the degree of 
flesibility with which they interpret it. If either individuals or governments 
are ready to use whatever methods they deem necessary to realize a futzda- 
merztalist interpretation of any ideology within a decade and throughout the 
world that ideology is likely to be politically important. On the other hand 
if its adherents are willing to use only persuasion and expect to realize their 
ideology only in otle cot72rn1[11ity or one country, or only in a thousand years, 
or are willing to interpret it in adaptation to a great variety of beliefs, cus- 
toms, and practices, as do most of the adherents of the great religions today, 
the ideology is not likely to be of great political importance. These differ- 
ences in time and area of realization and in flexibility of interpretation are 
certain to be reflected in the policies, strategies, and tactics of the move- 
ment, distinguishing revolution from evolution, coercion from persuasion, 
politics from education, vioIence from peace. 
Theoreticnl Comnlui~isrn. It is difficult to say how many people in the 
world believe in communism. The fourteen states that profess communism 
have a combined population of 1,106 million or over a third of the world's 
3,172 million people. There are many people in these fourteen states who 
do not believe in communism and many outside of them who do, especially 
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in India, Africa, and Latin America. Large Communist parties exist in 
France and Italy and small Communist ~a r t i e s  in the United States and 
most other western countries. No census, however, has been taken of people 
who believe in communism. 
The United States has no official relations with communism in this sense, 
anymore than it has with Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, science, liberalism, 
conservatism, or other ideologies. But the government's opinion about these 
beliefs may, of course, influence United States policy making. 
The people of the United States generally dislike communism and many 
fear it. This opinion influences government policy; in fact it is behind the 
major United States policy of '"containing communism," initiated by George 
Kennen in 1947, officially declared in the Truman doctrine of 1349 con- 
cerning Greece and Turkey, reasserted by President Eisenhower in connec- 
tion with the Middle East and Taiwan and by President Johnson in connec- 
tion with Vietnam. This dislike and fear of communism generally flows less 
from communism as a theory than from the nature of the activities of Com- 
munist states, parties, and persons. Americans tend to identify these violent 
and subversive activities in international relations and within the country 
with communism as a theory. It is significant that the article on "Commu- 
nism" in the Encyclopaedia Britunnicu (1967) deals with the strategy and 
tactics of the Russian communist government and party utilizing Lenin's 
analysis of the proper strategy and tactics of violent revolution. In this 
article communism is differentiated from socialism, which also professes the 
Marxist ideology, but seeks to realize it, not by violent revolution, but grad- 
ually by the strategy and tactics of parliamentary democracy. For discussion 
of communism as a theory one must look in the Britannica to the article on 
"Socialism," which presents a historical survey of socialist writers, including 
Marx, and of socialist movements. Although the Communist Manifesto of 
1848 suggested that violent revolution was necessary to realize communism, 
this has not been the opinion of all Marxists. Communism should not, there- 
fore, be identified wirh the revolutionary activities of the Soviets any more 
than Catholicism should be identified with the Spanish inquisition, Islam 
with the persecutions of Aurungzebe, or democracy (liberty, equality, and 
fraternity) with the guillotine and the activities of Robespierre. Neverthe- 
Iess the dislike of communism in some western countries, especially in the 
United States, often springs from this identification. They fear revolution, 
not communism. To India and other nonaligned countries, less apprehensive 
of revolution, communism is usually looked upon as a form of social organ- 
ization which deserves study and perhaps application. 
What is the theory of communism? It is a theory of the actual and the 
desirable relations of man to society. Historically and geographically there 
have been great variations in these relations manifested by bath the degree 
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and the methods of social control over the individual. Examples can be 
found of extremely centralized and extremely coercive control as in Sparta 
and the Incas; of considerably centralized and moderately coercive control 
as among the Jesuits, and in the Amana, Oneida, and other communities in 
the United States; and of much individual freedom as in Athens (except 
for the slaves and helots) and in modern "free" societies. Anthropologists 
find a11 types among primitive peoples. In pioneering settlements, such as 
Jamestown, Plymouth, and Jewish villages in Palestine "communism" was 
at first adopted, but as the economy developed, they tended to move to 
"capitalism," the opposite of the tendency asserted by Marx. 
When social control is very great, the system is called "socialism" in a 
broad sense and where little it is called "individualism." Either requires 
some central authority, but "socialism" has in practice required more be- 
cause such authority must not only maintain law and order, as in individu- 
alistic societies, but must also administer economic production, social secur- 
ity, and welfare programs. Individuals usually Iike freedom and tend to 
resist central authority, increasingly as the society is large and the center 
distant. Adequate authority to maintain "socialism" may result from envi- 
ronmental conditions. Primitive peoples who believe themselves surrounded 
by hostile gods and spirits, pioneers in a strange land, all people in time of 
war or high political tension perceive their environment as hostile and 
dangerous, and are willing to submit to a powerful central authority, 
whether a tribal chief or priesthood, a village council, a king, a dictator, a 
national government, or a federal executive, to escape disaster.' Strong cen- 
tral authority may also be created by the government itself utilizing the 
power of the slvord (military dictatorship), the power of the word (propa- 
ganda and religion), the power of latv and custom (the normal source of 
government authority), or the power of the purse (property, taxation, and 
the control of economic production and distribution). 
Marx thought that property which gives control of the economy was of 
primary importance and that other powers followed from it. Under feudnl- 
isnz, the ownership of land gave capacity to make laws protecting it and 
to defend it by military power. Under cnpitalism, the ownership of abstract 
property (capital), which developed as industry and trade succeeded agri- 
culture as the dominant means of production, gave capacity to control the 
state with its monopoly of arms and capacity to make and enforce law. 
Under socinlism, the ownership of the means of production by society as 
a whole would, according to Marx, give that society control of all the 
sources of power. 
Marx developed his ideal of society from his historical analysis. Only 
with socialism could the masses enjoy the material and moral benefits of 
society, because, although they constituted the major part of society, only 
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if they controlled the means of production and distribution could they es- 
cape exploitation by the ruling class and manage the economy in their own 
interest. That interest was expressed by the formula: "From each according 
to his abilities, to each according to his needs."Marx considered the virtue 
of this formula so obvious that after the Communist party, exercising the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat," had converted the masses of a11 countries 
to communism and eliminated the dangers of "capitalist encirclement," all 
would voluntarily follow the formula, coercion by central authority would 
be unnecessary, the "state would wither away," and communism would be- 
come identical with anarchism. All men would live freely and peacefully 
together like brothers. 
Marx thought that this ideal would develop inevitably by "historical de- 
terminism." He accepted Hegel's evolutionary theory that progress results 
from a dialectic - a thesis generates an antithesis, conflict between them 
results in a synthesis, which becomes a new thesis generating in turn its 
own antithesis, and a higher synthesis, ad infinitum. Marx, however, applied 
the dialectic, not to ideas, as did Hegel, but to economic systems, the ma- 
terial factors of production, thus creating "dialectical materialism." The 
proletariat, convinced by the "Communist Manifesto" of Marx and Engels 
(1848), would recognize their class conflict with the ruling, property-own- 
ing bourgeoisie, and would espouse socialism as the antithesis of capitalism. 
As capitalism undermined itself by exploiting and empoverishing the work- 
ers (thus eliminating its market and destroying the society), the Communist 
party wouId take possession of productive property and establish a final 
synthesis in a communist society. 
Marx considered this process inevitable as had been the bourgeoisie's 
recognition of their class conflict with the land-owning aristocracy, the en- 
suing conflict between feudalism and capitalism, and the eventual achieve- 
ment of a synthesis in the nation-state controlled by the bourgeois capital- 
ists.Wn the details of the process by which thesis and antithesis resulted in 
a synthesis, Marx was not entirely cIear. He called for violent revolution in 
the Manifesto of 1848 but in some of his writings gave support to a more 
evolutionary process utilizing education and propaganda. His successors 
divided into the evolutionary socialists (represented by the German Social 
Democrats and the British Labor Party) who thought that the parliamentary 
process and social legislation would eventually establish socialism, and the 
revolutionary Communists - the Bolshevists -led by Lenin, who wrote 
on the strategy of revolution involving much violence. 
Practical Cornmuni.\rrz. It is the revolutionary process of realizing com- 
munism that has, as noted, aroused antagonism in conservative quarters. 
There has been littIe hostility in the United States to evolutionary socialism. 
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The United States has taken steps in this direction itself in the "New Deal" 
of Franklin Roosevelt and the "Great Society" of Lyndon B. Johnson, al- 
though the concept of free enterprise modified by social welfare legislation 
(Walter Lippmann's "agenda of liberalism") has been propagandized, 
rather than the goal of eventual social ownership of all productive property. 
American conservatives, it is true, stigmatize these programs as "creeping 
communism." The major opposition, however, has been to the revolutionary 
methods of Lenin and Stalin in Russia and of Mao in China. It is to be noted 
that this opposition has existed, not only in the western capitalist countries, 
but in less degree in the unaligned countries and in the communist countries 
themselves, as witnessed by Khruschev's criticism of Stalin's "cult of per- 
sonality*' after the latter's death in 1953, and by the opposition to Mao, 
countered by the "red g u a r d  movement, in China in 1966-67. 
Adherence to a philosophy of revolutionary violence, and its practice 
internally and externally, has generally waned as time has passed after the 
inception of a revolution, and conservative opposition to revolutionary tac- 
tics has increased. In 1967 the Chinese revolution was 18 years old, the 
Soviet 50 years old, the French 178 years old, the American 191 years old, 
and the British 277 years old. As Nehru once said in New York, comparing 
the United States and Russia from a neutralist point of view, the major dif- 
ference is the length of time since their respective revolutions. As time 
passes revolutionary enthusiasm subsides, more time is allowed for the 
achievement of revolutionary ideas, even ultimate achievement becomes 
limited to less than the entire human race,' and greater flexibilty of inter- 
pretation, called "revisionism" by the "fundamentalists," becomes permis- 
sible. It has been pointed out that every successful revolution must have a 
bible sufficiently large and ambiguous to have texts capable of sustaining 
any policy which the exigencies of the occasion seem to make expedient. 
The Old Testament, for example, gives support both to beating swords into 
plowshares and beating plowshares into swords,hnd Marxism supports 
both the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "withering away of the 
state." 
This latitude of ideological interpretation permits, as Sorokin has pointed 
out," convergence of practices under capitaIism and communism, partic- 
ularly in the practices of the United States and the Soviet Union, as their 
basic technologies become similar. To the same effect an editorial in the 
Hotrsrot~ Post of November 17, 1966 reads: 
Thers is a deep g ~ ~ l f  between theory and reality. . . . It is not surprising that 
Conimunisni as it actually exists in the world today is a far  cry from that en- 
visioned by Maru. And there is just about as great a difference between capital- 
istic theory and fact. It is not beyond the realm of possibilities that. if the advo- 
cates of the Communist and capitalistic ideologies can keep from blowing each 
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other off the face of the earth, they all will end LIP eventually in some middle 
ground where the two systems will be hardly distinguishable. Even if this hap- 
pens, however, it probably will not be admitted by zealots on either s ide . .  . . 
But hard facts and realities w ~ l l  continue to prevail in the end. People generally 
are Iess concerned with ideology and theory than they are with having a system 
that works and serves their needs well. 
Market gardens for each colIective farmer, and free markets for distributing 
the products of these gardens exist all over Russia. Art, literature, even 
ideological interpretations are decreasingly censured in Russia. Competition 
exists between the managers of firms and of collective farms. The profit 
incentive is recognized. Interest is deveIoping in sports, cosmetics, consumer 
goods, and travel. Common practices converge from opposite directions. 
Theoretical expressions remain diverse supported by different authoritative 
texts, but the reaI differences that remain are a consequence more of dif- 
ferences in national cultures and historical experiences than of differences 
in ideology. In similar manner the ideological conflicts, between Christen- 
dom and Islam, between Protestantism and Catholicism, between democ- 
racy and aristocracy, which formerly led to crusades, wars of religion, and 
revolutionary wars no longer prevent the convergence of practices best 
adapted to the increasingly similar technologies. 
Communism and li7tert?arionnl Relatioiw. What has been the relation of 
the United States with governments that profess communism? There has 
ceased to be a monolithic communist bloc exercising political power di- 
rected by the Kremlin. There was such a bloc in Stalin's time. European 
satellites, China, and other Far Eastern communist countries followed his 
lead, but even before Stalin's death, Tito broke away and muffled dissent 
occurred in other communist countries. Some Americans think this bloc 
still exists, but few Europeans, Asians, or Africans think so. 
The United States government recognizes that this monolithic bloc no 
longer exists and pursues different policies toward each communist state, 
tailored to the particular situation. Of the fourteen communist states, it 
trades and gives economic assistance to Yugoslavia and Poland, and is 
deveIoping similar relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, CzcchosIovakia, and 
Hungary. The relations of the United States with the Soviet Union have 
been improving since the death of Stalin in 1953, with considerable coop- 
eration in nuclear control, exchange of persons, conclusion of a Consular 
treaty, and prospects of most-favored-nation trading relations. There have 
been setbacks, it is true. as in the Hungarian affair of 1956 and the Vietnam 
hostilities. The United States does not recognize the Mongolian, Cuban, or 
Albanian governments, but associates with them in the United Nations. It 
refuses to recognize Mainland China and East Germany and has kept them 
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out of the United Nations. It is virtually at war with North Korea and actu- 
ally at war with North Vietnam, both of which it has kept out of the United 
Nations. 
The differences in policy toward these states reflect differences in their 
policy toward the United States and these differences spring more from 
national interest than from ideological differences. The ideological cold war 
has been an element in creating mutual suspicion and inhibiting mutual 
trust, but actual relations with each communist state have been affected 
more by the principle that hostile acts invoke retaliation and friendly acts 
invoke reciprocity. Nationality and pride seem always to be more important 
than ideology in international relations as de Gaulle both declares and 
illustrates. To discover the values which underlie the actual policies and 
decisions of governments one must hunt beyond official ideology. 
The enduring interests common to most sovereign states have been 
security, including territorial integrity, respect, and political independence; 
freedom in the exercise of domestic jurisdiction and development of dis- 
tinctive culture; influence, including prestige, power position, status, spheres 
of influence, alliances; and prosperity, including technological development 
and access to trade, markets, and raw materiakT 
Since conflicts in these interests have developed between states of similar 
ideology, and opportunities for fruitful cooperation have developed between 
states of different ideology, both ideological blocs have tended to break up. 
China, Yugoslavia, and Albania have broken from Soviet leadership, and 
other European satellites are tending to do so as they search for more trade 
with the West, A visitor to these states finds that official guides emphasize 
the national distinctiveness of the country and say nothing of communism, 
and often less than nothing of Kremlin leadership. In Russia people are 
interested in security and prosperity and worried by United States encircle- 
ment. Soviet pressure on the "satellites" has relaxed since the intervention 
in Hungary in 1956. There is doubt whether they would prove allies or 
enemies if the Soviet government tried to move through them to expand in 
the West, and one can detect no evidence of such a policy. Russia is worried 
by Chinese aggressiveness in regard to boundaries; by its play for Ieader- 
ship of the communist movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and 
by its noncooperation in assistance to North Vietnam or in promoting a 
negotiated settlement of that conflict. 
China, whose revolution is most recent among the communist states, 
seems to be the most interested in expanding communist ideology but its 
major aims appear to be national. China desires to end the humiliation it 
suffered from Western aggressions and interventions in the nineteenth cen- 
tury. It wants to gain full recognition as a great power and leadership of 
the communist movement, at least in Asia. It would like to recover the 
86 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
boundaries in the Himalayas, Siberia, Southeast Asia, and Formosa which 
it had before the period of European and Japanese imperial expansion. It  
wants to modernize its technology and industry and to increase the standard 
of living of its people. It wants a Far Eastern Monroe doctrine to eliminate 
bases and spheres of influence of overseas powers in the Far East. Its con- 
flict with Russia in several of these interests may be more important than 
its conflict on theoretical communism, with charges of Soviet "revisionism." 
While the struggle for leadership between Maoists and conservatives con- 
tinues, it is difficult to predict the course of Chinese policy in detail, but it 
seems likely that the goals referred to will continue and the differences be- 
tween the Chinese factions will be mainly on methods. 
The Western bloc has also been breaking up. De Gaulle has left NATO 
and talks of a Europe to the Urals. SEAT0 has proved of little importance. 
The Manila meeting on Vietnam in the fall of 1966 did not include three 
of its members, Pakistan, France, and Britain, all of whom take a dim view 
of American policy there, but it did include two nonmembers, South Viet- 
nam and Malaysia. Japan, also a theoretical ally of the United States, gives 
no support to the Vietnam policy and wants to trade with China. The 
United States policy of not recognizing Communist China is widely opposed 
by United States allies in Europe and Asia, many of whom recognize that 
country and support its admission to the United Nations. 
Fear of United States encirclement was a major factor in maintaining the 
communist bloc, and fear of communist expansion was a major factor in 
maintaining NATO and other anti-Communist alliances. These fears have 
not been wholly dissipated, but they have been greatly reduced and both 
blocs have tended to disintegrate. 
Unaligned states, wooed by both blocs, have exerted a greater influence 
in world politics than their military power would suggest. A third of the 
world's population, and over half of the members of the United Nations, 
are in this group. They have exerted great influence in eliminating colonial- 
ism, reducing racial prejudice, and opposing intervention in civil strife. To 
this end they have invoked United Nations principles supporting the self- 
determination of peoples, respect for human rights, and nonintervention in 
domestic questions. These countries generally wish to strengthen the United 
Nations and their attitudes have made the great powers hesitate to utilize 
the veto in the Security Council in a way which would offend them. This 
was illustrated in the Congo situation of 1961 which was dealt with by the 
Security Council. On all critical resolutions one or more of the great powers 
abstained but did not veto. Though the nonaligned powers tend to act to- 
gether on a few matters, their votes in the United Nations indicate little 
more solidarity than does the "free world" group. In such votes there is still 
the greatest degree of solidarity in the communist group, due partly to the 
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absence of most of the Asian communist states. I t  would appear that the 
bipolar world of the cold war period is merging into a world of national 
states. 
Future Prospects. I t  seems probable that nationalism moderated by in- 
ternationalism will be the trend of the future, as the world continues to 
shrink, the capabilities of nuclear destruction increase, and governments 
acquire a more realistic comprehension of the requirements for survival in 
the nuclear age. Opposing this trend are the cold war images lingering in 
the minds of many, especially in the United States, and the imperialist 
ambition of great powers to exert a dominant influence on world affairs 
manifested especially by the inclination of the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and China to intervene in civil strife to "contain communism" or to 
"assist wars of liberation." Extreme nationalist sentiments opposing inter- 
nationalism manifested especially in France, and widespread hesitancy to 
strengthen international law and the United Nations also oppose this trend. 
Adequate financing of United Nations peace-keeping, forces, universalizing 
of United Nations membership, extending the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the World Court, improving the procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
political disputes, and disarmament are among steps to this end which have 
been long debated but not realized. 
A trend toward a world of nation states, peacefully coexisting under the 
influence of international law and international organization has been the 
trend since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which relegated ideological 
questions to the domestic jurisdiction of states, and especially since general 
international organization began to develop in the mid-nineteenth century, 
providing, with increasing efficiency, permanent machinery for the main- 
tenance of international law, international cooperation, peaceful settlement 
of disputes, and prevention of hostilities. There have been lapses in this 
trend, but by their treaties, their declarations, their budgets, and their par- 
ticipation, states have increasingly manifested the conviction that effective 
international law and international institutions are necessary. 
The principles of the United Nations Charter are an advance on the 
international law of the nineteenth century, but improved procedures are 
needed to assure their observance and to kecp them up to date in a rapidly 
changing world. Rapid steps toward world federation are not to be expected, 
but gradual building on existing foundations may reconcile the needs for 
change and for stability, respect for human rights and for states rights, 
elimination of war and rectification of wrongs, nationalism and inter- 
nationalism. 
Governments should heed the experience registered in the progress of 
international law and international organization. If the interest of all is 
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"peaceful coexistence" in "a world safe for diversity" this experience is 
more likely to serve the national interest of each than is ad hoc calculation 
of power politics. Cold war rivalries have in recent times induced aggres- 
sions, interventions, and subversions in violation of international law and 
the principles of the Charter. It is to be hoped that the fading of the cold 
war, appreciation of the perils of power politics, and understanding of the 
trend of international relations will induce appreciation of the need for a 
world rule of law and energy in devising means to realize it. 
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